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INTO THE BRIAR PATCH?:  POWER SHIFTS 
BETWEEN PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
AFTER UNITED STATES V. BOOKER 
Margareth Etienne∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the popular series of Uncle Remus fairytales by Joel Chandler Harris,1 
Brer Fox is constantly trying to figure out a way to get back at his nemesis, 
the uppity Brer Rabbit.  In The Wonderful Tar-Baby story, Brer Fox mixes tar 
and turpentine and creates a figure that he calls Tar-Baby.  Brer Fox puts a 
large straw hat on Tar-Baby’s head and places her by the side of the road 
while he hides in the bushes and waits for Brer Rabbit to come along.  Soon 
enough, Brer Rabbit comes sashaying down the road, in his usual “lippity-
clippity, clippity-lippity” way.  He stops and greets Tar-Baby, who doesn’t 
say a word.  Brer Rabbit, not used to being ignored, tries to charm Tar-Baby 
into talking and grows increasingly frustrated as she remains silent.  Finally, 
Brer Rabbit hits and kicks at Tar-Baby until he is stuck in the ball of tar.  
Brer Fox, who has been watching everything from his hiding place, 
suddenly appears and is delighted that he has finally succeeded in catching 
Brer Rabbit. 
As a triumphant Brer Fox wonders aloud whether he should kill Brer 
Rabbit by barbequing, drowning, hanging him or worse, Brer Rabbit begs 
and begs his captor to do whatever he wants with him so long as he does 
not “fling [him] in dat briar-patch.”2  Brer Fox, wanting Brer Rabbit to die 
the most miserable death apparently imaginable to rabbits, throws him 
right into the middle of the briar patch.  Moments later, Brer Fox watches as 
Brer Rabbit skips away gleefully, combing the tar out of his hair with the 
twigs and chips from the briar patch.  Brer Rabbit could be heard hollering 
triumphantly that he had been born and bred in the briar patch.  Brer Fox 
had been tricked again, and the ongoing battle between Brers Fox and 
Rabbit is left to another day.3 
                                                 
∗  Associate Professor and Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Fellow, University of Illinois 
College of Law.  I would like to thank Patrick J. Keenan for his tremendously helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.  I am also very grateful to Amy Tomaszewski for 
her efficient and valuable research assistance. 
1 JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS, THE FAVORITE UNCLE REMUS (1948). 
2 Id. at 53. 
3  The first part of this wonderful Southern fable begins in The Wonderful Tar-Baby story, and 
continues in The Briar Patch story.  Id. at 47-50, 51-54. 
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The Tar-Baby story is instructive in understanding the latest 
developments in the regulation of federal sentencing.  The Supreme Court, 
in United States v. Booker,4 threw federal prosecutors into the briar patch of 
much maligned indiscriminate sentencing.  The Department of Justice can 
already be heard complaining about the Court’s decision to make the 
Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.  But prosecutors narrowly 
escaped a situation that could have proved much more difficult for the 
Government when the Court decided not to engraft the Sixth Amendment 
jury-trial requirement onto the Sentencing Reform Act.5  Although only 
time will reveal the true winners and losers of the Booker decision, there is 
good reason to believe that the prosecution has won this round and that 
criminal defendants will have to seek favorable sentencing changes 
elsewhere.   
In this Article, I consider the Court’s characterization of the 
constitutional problem in federal sentencing and examine its chosen remedy 
in assessing the potential ramifications for the Government and the defense. 
I argue that the solution carved out by the Booker Court was the best 
solution the Government could have hoped for following Blakely v. 
Washington6 and its predecessors.  First, I note that the Court did not 
explicitly require that the reasonable doubt standard be used at sentencing 
and discuss the implications of this omission.  This arguably eliminates one 
of the principal procedural safeguards sought by the defense.  For many 
defendants, this will permit “the sentencing factor tail” to continue 
“wagging the conviction dog.”7  Second, I contend that judges will continue 
applying the guidelines even though they are now advisory.  Although the 
Booker decision is only a few months old, the preliminary evidence supports 
this prediction.  Indeed, in many instances, judges will be free to give higher 
sentences than those previously available under the guidelines.  Third, 
defendants who want to challenge their advisory sentences will be subject 
to a vague and watered-down “reasonableness” standard on appeal rather 
than being entitled to the prior de novo review by appellate courts.  No 
doubt, government prosecutors did not seek a dismantling of the 
                                                 
4 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
5 In fact, the Booker Court correctly notes that, in the final analysis, its chosen remedy is 
remarkably similar to that urged by the Government.  See id. at 758-59, 768. 
6 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
7 See infra Part II.  This interesting phrase was first adopted in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S. 79 (1986), when the Court alluded to the potential constitutional problems inherent in 
certain sentencing practices.  A version of the phrase was again repeated by Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Court in Apprendi, who declared that “[w]hen a judge’s finding based on a mere 
preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is 
appropriately characterized as ‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.’”  
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 [2005], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss3/5
2005] Power Shifts Between Prosecution and Defense 743 
mandatory guideline system any more than Brer Rabbit sought to be 
entangled in tar.  But once prosecutors found themselves in this 
predicament, an advisory guideline scheme was a “briar-patch” solution by 
the Supreme Court. 
II.  THE BOOKER DECISION:  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM AND ITS 
REMEDY 
The only thing predictable about the Supreme Court’s recent holding 
and remedy in United States v. Booker has been the reaction to it:  Prosecutors 
are disappointed.8  Defendants and their lawyers are overly optimistic.9  
Federal judges are (mostly) jubilant.10  Congress is angry on one side of the 
aisle and cautiously hopeful on the other.11  Many see in the decision the 
end of federal criminal sentencing as we know it.  Most of the stakeholders 
                                                 
8  Carl Huse & Adam Liptak, New Fight over Controlling Punishments Is Widely Seen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29 (reporting that Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray, 
speaking for the Justice Department, lamented: “We are disappointed that the decision made 
the guidelines advisory in nature.”). 
9 See Mark Hamblett, Defense Lawyers Hail Sentencing Decisions, 231 N.Y.L.J. 1 (describing 
the defense as “ecstatic” about the Booker decision); Lorraine Woellert & Mike France, Corporate 
Cases:  Time to Cut a Deal?:  A New Ruling Could Empower Defendants—Until Congress Rewrites 
Sentencing Rules, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 43 (explaining that the decision “warmed the hearts 
of many criminal defense lawyers—and their clients”). 
 The optimism on the part of criminal defendants is understandable as the decision has 
been widely (and incorrectly in some cases) portrayed as a victory for defendants even though 
one of the named defendants is likely to be adversely affected by the decision.  See, e.g., David 
Stout, Supreme Court Rules Judges Are Not Bound by Sentencing Rules, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. 
LAW., available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/mediasources/20050112c  (Jan. 12, 2005) 
(although Fanfan’s sentence is likely  to be increased on remand, this article notes that “[t]he 
ruling was a victory for defendants, Freddie J. Booker and Ducan Fanfan, whose sentences will 
now be reviewed and probably adjusted downward.”). 
10 See Hulse & Liptak, supra note 8 (quoting U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein as 
exclaiming: “I’m really elated, and I think most judges will be, too”); Myron H. Thompson, 
Sentencing and Sensibility, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A23 (an op-ed piece by U.S. District Judge 
Myron Thompson comparing the pre-Booker federal guidelines to Draco’s laws in ancient 
Athens that spawned the adjective “draconian.”). 
11 Republican Senator Orrin G. Hatch was apparently disappointed but unsurprised by the 
decision, while Florida Republican Tom Feeney characterized the decision as an “egregious 
overreach.”  Hulse & Liptak, supra note 8.  In contrast, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy took a 
wait-and-see approach: “Congress should resist the urge to rush in with quick fixes that would 
only generate more uncertainty and litigation and do nothing to protect public safety.”  Tony 
Mauro, Sentence Fragment:  A Supreme Court Decision Last Week Turned Back the Clock 20 Years on 
Sentencing.  Now Judges Are in Control and Congress Is Watching, LEG. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 1.  
Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D), stated that he was “confident that the vast 
majority of federal judges will continue to apply the guidelines in ways that respect the basic 
goals of fairness and consistency in sentencing criminal defendants.”  United States v. Booker, 
United States v. Fanfan and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Statement of Senator 
Edward Kennedy, Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 12, 2005), at http://action.democratic 
majority.com/victory2004/index.asp?test=true&ID=325 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). 
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in the federal criminal system are hurriedly attempting to sort out how the 
new system will look and who will be the winners and losers under the new 
regime.   
In Booker, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed by a five to four 
majority12 its previous holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial requires that any fact used to increase the sentence of a criminal 
defendant beyond the maximum provided for in a mandatory guidelines 
scheme must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.13  The court further found that the federal sentencing 
guidelines were no exception to this general rule.14  This application of the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial right is of little surprise because it is the natural 
culmination of a handful of cases, starting with Jones v. United States15 and 
Apprendi v. New Jersey.16  Less than a year before the decision in Booker, the 
Court reversed a defendant’s sentence in Blakely v. Washington17 because the 
sentence had been enhanced beyond the guidelines maximum (but not the 
statutory maximum) based on facts found at sentencing by the judge by a 
preponderance of the evidence.18  Although Blakely concerned the 
Washington State Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court’s holding 
understandably cast into grave doubt the constitutionality of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.19  
Thus, the Court’s finding in Booker that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines suffered the same constitutional problem as the Washington 
State Guidelines was hardly unexpected.  What was more surprising than 
the decision to continue with the Apprendi-line of cases was the Court’s 
                                                 
12 The Booker decision consists of two distinct majority opinions.  Justice Stevens authored 
the first majority opinion addressing the constitutionality of the federal guidelines.  He was 
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.  The second majority opinion, 
outlining the remedy, was supported by a different majority of justices.  The remedial opinion 
was authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy and 
Ginsburg. 
13 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005). 
14 Id. at 755 (explaining that “our holding in Blakely applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.”). 
15 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999). 
16 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Although most practitioners and scholars became familiar with the 
issue in Apprendi and consider it to be the inception of the line of cases leading to Booker, the 
Court properly notes that the question first arose in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230 
(1999).  See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752 (noting that the Sixth Amendment problem at issue in Booker 
was “first considered in Jones and developed in Apprendi”). 
17 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). 
18 Id. at 2534. 
19 O’Connor’s dissent in Blakely asserted that the decision would probably apply to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at 2549-50 (“The structure of the Federal Guidelines 
likewise does not, as the Government half-heartedly suggests, provide any grounds for 
distinction”).  O’Connor made a similar point in Apprendi.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 549-554. 
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chosen remedy for the Sixth Amendment infirmity.  Rather than require 
that juries henceforth be used to find all facts necessary to determine the 
guideline range, a different five to four majority of the Court20 chose to 
sever and excise the portions of the Sentencing Reforming Act  that made 
the guidelines mandatory.21  The justices who favored this remedy over the 
jury-sentencing remedy argued that it was more faithful to the overriding 
goals of Congress’s sentencing reform.22  Ironically, the end result is an 
advisory guideline system that more closely resembles the indeterminate 
sentencing scheme that preceded the promulgation of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
III.  THE TAIL THAT WAGGED THE DOG BEFORE APPRENDI AND BLAKELY 
Defendants appear to be the biggest losers under Booker.  Of course, 
they have the most to lose.  The promise of applying the Sixth Amendment 
jury trial requirement to sentencing enhancements was one of fairness.  
Recognizing in the first part of the opinion that “jury factfinding may 
impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants,” the 
Court nonetheless maintains that “the interest in fairness and reliability 
protected by the right to a jury trial—a common-law right that defendants 
enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment—
has always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.”23  The 
opportunity for greater fairness and reliability in sentencing was a 
significant loss for defendants in the Booker decision. 
The principal concern that Sixth Amendment jury factfinding was 
expected to alleviate was that of the tail wagging the dog in sentencing.  In 
1986, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,24 the Supreme Court alluded to what it 
perceived to be an unacceptable (but inapplicable, in that case) 
constitutional problem in criminal sentencing.  Denyl McMillan faced a 
mandatory minimum sentence of five years because after his jury trial and 
conviction for aggravated assault, the sentencing judge additionally found 
that he visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime.  
McMillan successfully argued at sentencing that Pennsylvania’s mandatory 
minimum statute was unconstitutional because the evidence used to 
enhance his sentence should be considered an element of the crime to be 
                                                 
20 See supra note 12.  Notably, Justice Ginsburg is seemingly the only justice in agreement 
with the entire decision, both on the constitutionality finding and its remedy. 
21 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757 (contrasting the Court’s chosen remedy of rendering the 
Guidelines advisory with the remedy proposed by the dissenters of engrafting a Sixth 
Amendment “jury-trial” requirement onto the Guidelines). 
22 Id. at 767. 
23 Id. at 756. 
24 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.25  The State appealed and 
won before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  In affirming the state 
appellate court, the United States Supreme Court recognized that states 
may define certain factors elements of crimes or sentencing enhancements 
(and prescribe burdens of proof accordingly) so long as the state did so 
within certain constitutional limits.26  The Pennsylvania scheme was 
determined to operate within constitutional bounds partly because it gave 
“no impression of having been tailored to permit the [sentencing factor] 
finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”27  
Later in Apprendi and Blakely, the Court set aside the sentences largely 
because of the questions of fairness invoked by the tail wagging the dog in 
sentencing.  In Apprendi, the defendant complained that the potential 
doubling of his sentence from ten years to twenty years based on a judicial 
finding at sentencing that his offense was a hate crime violated his due 
process rights.  Judge Stevens, writing for the Court, declared that “[w]hen 
a judge’s finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes 
an increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately characterized 
as ‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.’”28  
The Blakely Court relied more heavily on the Sixth Amendment than on 
the due process clause in its assessment of the tail-wagging problem raised 
by the defendant.  Ralph Blakely entered into a plea agreement where he 
pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping rather than first-degree 
kidnapping.  At sentencing, the court determined that he had acted with 
deliberate cruelty.29  This sentencing factor effectively raised his sentence to 
that which he would have received had he been convicted of the first-
degree kidnapping charge.30  The Supreme Court reversed Blakely’s 
judicially-enhanced sentence, stating that reversal was needed to give full 
effect to the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial.31  For the jury to act as a 
check over the judiciary, according to the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the 
judge must derive the power to sentence wholly from the jury’s verdict.   
                                                 
25 Id. at 82-83. 
26 Id. at 86 (“Pennsylvania chose not to redefine those offenses in order to so include it, and 
Patterson teaches that we should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from 
pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties.”) (citing 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)). 
27 Id. at 88. 
28 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000). 
29 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534 (2004). 
30 Id. at 2539. 
31 Id. at 2538. 
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Justice Scalia identified the crux of the dog-wagging problem that 
Apprendi and Blakely sought to correct:  the absence of oversight in a system 
where the jury is “relegated to making a determination that the defendant 
at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial 
inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish.”32  
We now know in hindsight that Apprendi and Blakely represented the high-
water marks for the aspiration that the jury trial safeguard might work to 
inject some notion of fit between conviction and sentence.  Any real hope of 
resolving this problem in federal prosecutions in the near future died with 
the remedy adopted in Booker. 
IV.  THE TAIL CONTINUES TO WAG THE DOG POST-BOOKER 
Federal criminal defendants enjoyed their heyday, such as it was, 
between Apprendi and Booker.  In the period following Apprendi, prosecutors 
regularly charged in their indictments all sentence-enhancing facts (such as 
drug amounts) that could lead to an increase in the statutory maximum.  
These facts provided notice to defendants of their full sentencing exposure 
and had to be found by a jury at trial or admitted as part of a guilty plea.  In 
Blakely, the Court suggested that this practice ought to be applied to all facts 
(other than the fact of a prior conviction) that could alter the “maximum 
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”33   
The sentencing system rejected in Blakely was essentially the system that 
prevailed in federal criminal cases.  The government needed only to possess 
enough reliable, admissible evidence to convict the defendant of something; 
once the conviction was obtained, the government could use virtually any 
information it possessed to obtain the sentence it desired.  After Blakely, the 
assumption that this reasoning would soon be explicitly applied to the 
federal system led many federal prosecutors to charge all sentencing-
enhancing facts or demand their admission at guilty pleas.  Thus, during the 
short post-Blakely, pre-Booker window, many defendants enjoyed a true 
reprieve from the tail-wagging-dog phenomenon.  
The reprieve ends with Booker because for all practical purposes, that 
decision will continue to allow the tail to wag the dog.  Once a defendant is 
convicted of an underlying charge, the prosecution can seek to enhance her 
sentence up to the statutory maximum (not just the now-advisory guideline 
maximum) by presenting evidence that was neither found by the jury nor 
admitted by the defendant in a guilty plea.  This is so because the Booker 
                                                 
32 Id. at 2539 (emphasis in original). 
33 Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original). 
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Court reaffirmed the judge’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to consider 
a broad range of facts in imposing a sentence.34  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
these factors would likely include all of the grounds for enhancement that 
were possible under the once-mandatory Guidelines, including relevant 
and uncharged conduct—perhaps the most criticized dog-wagging basis for 
enhancements.35   
Anyone who doubts that defendants will continue to be sentenced on 
the basis of conduct that was either uncharged, acquitted or unproven 
beyond a reasonable doubt should consider the fate of Ducan Fanfan, the 
defendant whose case was argued alongside Freddie Booker’s before the 
Supreme Court.36  Fanfan was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at least five hundred 
grams of cocaine.37  Based on the facts found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Fanfan faced a maximum guideline sentence of seventy-
eight months.  At sentencing, the prosecution presented and the judge 
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, additional facts authorizing a 
sentence in the range of 188-235 months.38  Specifically, the court 
determined that Fanfan was a leader or organizer of the criminal activity 
and that he was responsible for relevant conduct that would bring his drug 
quantities up to 2.5 kilograms of cocaine and over 261 grams of crack.39  
Nonetheless, relying on Blakely’s Sixth Amendment reasoning, the judge 
determined that he could not impose a sentence based on facts not found by 
the jury.40   
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the Fanfan case, authorizing 
the Government to seek resentencing.  The clear implication for Fanfan is 
that the sentencing court may now consider the nature of Fanfan’s role and 
the additional drugs not found by the jury in crafting Fanfan’s new 
                                                 
34 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (requiring the sentencing court to impose a sentence sufficient 
but not greater than necessary to comply with legislatively determined purposes of 
punishment).  In addition to the characteristics of the offense and of the defendant, the 
sentencing court must also weigh the need for deterrence, public safety, punishment, and 
rehabilitative treatment.  See id. § 3553 (a)(1)-(2). 
35 See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years after the Federal Sentencing Revolution:  How Mandatory 
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87 
(2003); Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines:  A Critique of Federal Sentencing, 458 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 
(2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf; Todd E. Witten, Comment, 
Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation:  Government Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697 (1996). 
36 Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593 (D. Me. June 28, 2004). 
37 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 747 (2005). 
38 Id. at 741. 
39 Id. at 747. 
40 Id. 
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sentence.  Fanfan will likely not evoke much sympathy to the extent that he 
appears to have benefited from a post-Blakely windfall.  But whether Fanfan 
got a windfall depends, of course, on whether he is actually responsible for 
the additional drugs and actually organized or led the drug conspiracy.  
There can be little doubt that a more reliable answer to that question would 
result from a requirement at trial or sentencing that the Government prove 
the contested facts beyond a reasonable doubt.   
Nothing in the Booker remedy requires that the Government’s evidence 
in Fanfan or in any other case be put to that test.  Indeed, most courts that 
have considered this question since Booker have found that defendants are 
not entitled to jury determinations of sentencing facts or to a reasonable 
doubt standard of proof.41  After Booker, the Government can continue to do 
just what Justice Scalia condemned in Blakely:  obtain a “back-door” 
conviction for a more serious offense on which it had only scant (or 
preponderance-level) evidence simply because it could obtain a conviction 
for a less serious offense beyond a reasonable doubt.42  The Court’s 
justification of this post-Booker result—that nothing in our history of 
sentencing proscribes judges from considering a variety of factors in 
sentencing43—rings hollow.  The relevant question is not whether courts 
have traditionally been afforded the discretion to consider a wide range of 
sentencing factors, but whether there are some factors upon which the 
Government may not rely absent a more reliable and exacting burden of 
proof.  Whatever one thinks is the appropriate sentence for Fanfan, it is 
certain that the process by which it will now be derived will more closely 
resemble the pre-Guideline indeterminate sentencing procedures where all 
facts were fair game for the sentencer to consider.  
V.  THE BRIAR PATCH REMEDY 
Like Brer Rabbit, federal prosecutors were merely sullied a bit after the 
Booker decision.  While it is true that the Court’s remedy primarily reflects a 
choice for judicial sentencing over jury sentencing,44 it also expressed some 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Sharpley,  399 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Nolan, 397 
F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 2005).  But see United States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1029 
(D. Neb. 2005) (Battalion, J.) (“[T]his court finds that it will continue to require that facts that 
enhance a sentence are properly pled in an indictment or information, and either admitted, or 
submitted to a jury (or to the court if the right to a trial by jury is waived) for determination by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
42 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004) (suggesting that a rejection of Apprendi 
could lead to the scenario of a conviction for murder even if the only fact found by the jury was 
that the defendant made “an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene”). 
43 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765-66. 
44 The Court is careful to cast this not as its own policy determination but rather as its 
interpretation of the legislative preference as being more consistent with congressional intent.  
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distrust of what has become prosecutorial sentencing45 in the federal 
system.  A good part of the remedial opinion was devoted to criticizing the 
view that prosecutors were better capable of eliminating sentencing 
disparity.46  A principle concern against engrafting the jury trial 
requirement onto the Sentencing Reform Act was the concern that once 
combined with prosecutorial selectivity in charging decisions, jury 
sentencing would lead to unjustified disparity and disuniformity.  
Notwithstanding this negative portrayal, prosecutors emerged from Booker 
as well as could be expected.  Sentencings will continue in most federal 
courts as they have since the implementation of the Guidelines. 
To the extent that the power of sentencing discretion has been restored 
to the federal bench, judges appear to be the biggest winners in the post-
Booker world of indeterminate federal sentencing.  Yet there is ample 
evidence that judges may not take advantage of their new-found 
discretion.47  Indeed, the very preliminary data suggests that so far courts 
are following the guidelines in the overwhelming majority of cases.  During 
hearings held by the United States Sentencing Commission approximately 
one month following the Booker decision, the chairman of the commission 
                                                                                                             
The Court makes clear that the merits or demerits of judge-sentencing over jury-sentencing is a 
policy question that it does not purport to address.  Rather, the remedial majority explains its 
rejection of the jury factfinding remedy on grounds of legislative intent.  The Court mounts 
several persuasive arguments as to why jury factfinding would be impractical and inconsistent 
with Congress’ sentencing reform agenda.  This may be so but the question remains as to 
whether, in the eyes of Congress, judicial fact-finding would still be preferable. 
45 Some have argued that the prosecutor’s power to charge bargain provides immense 
power that essentially amounts to sentencing power.  See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S 
TRIUMPH 205-230 (2003) (arguing that in certain guideline sentencing systems the true 
sentencer becomes the prosecutor); David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 78 JUDICATURE 196 (1995); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981). 
46 Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion noted:  “guidelines sentencing empowers prosecutors, 
even where the guidelines’ authors try to fight that tendency.”  Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 782 (quoting 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2548, 2559-2560 (2004)). 
47 See Tom Schoenberg, For One Wary Judge, a Toe in the Water:  Paul Friedman’s New World of 
Penalties and Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at 1 (explaining that “locally, prosecutors say 
they aren’t seeing much deviation from the guidelines.  In the Eastern District of Virginia, U.S. 
Attorney Paul McNulty says fewer than 10 of the sentences handed down since Booker/Fanfan 
have been outside the guidelines”); see also Adam Liptak, Judges’ New Leeway in Choosing 
Sentences May Result in Little Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A14 (asserting that the few 
states having advisory sentencing guideline systems show “remarkable conformity” between 
the guideline’s suggested sentences and the sentences actually imposed). 
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noted that only nine percent of the 733 sentences imposed did not comply 
with the previously mandatory guidelines.48 
Consistent with this data, several judges have already announced that 
they expect to continue with sentencing business as usual except in the 
rarest of circumstances.49  One federal judge warned his colleagues on the 
bench to use their “newly granted freedom” responsibly by not deviating 
too much or too often from the guidelines.50  Another judge explained: 
These principles change the Guidelines from being 
mandatory to being advisory, but it is important to bear in 
mind that Booker/Fanfan, and section 3553(a) do more than 
render the Guidelines a body of casual advice, to be 
consulted or overlooked at the whim of a sentencing judge. 
Thus, it would be a mistake to think that, after 
Booker/Fanfan, district judges may return to the sentencing 
regime that existed before 1987 and exercise unfettered 
discretion to select any sentence within the applicable 
statutory maximum and minimum.  On the contrary, the 
Supreme Court expects sentencing judges faithfully to 
discharge their statutory obligation to “consider” the 
Guidelines and all of the other factors listed in section 
3553(a).51  
This jurist’s view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonishment 
in Booker that judges were still required to consider the Guidelines, provide 
clear reasons for their sentencing decisions, and continue to cooperate with 
Sentencing Commission reporting requirements.52   
                                                 
48 See Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decision for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  Hearing 
Before the House Subcommittee On Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) 
(statement of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission).  These 
figures should be contrasted to the pre-Booker sentences, in which, for example, judges in 2002 
adhered to the guidelines in only sixty-five percent of cases.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS Fig. G (2002), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/fig-g.pdf [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]. 
49 See United States v. Barkley, No. 04-CR-119-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2060, *13-14 (N.D. 
Okla. Jan. 24, 2005); United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).  But see United 
States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (criticizing Wilson and arguing that 
“Booker is not an invitation to do business as usual”). 
50 Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (Cassell, J.) (imposing the same 188 month sentence in a post-
Booker robbery case that the pre-Booker guidelines would have mandated). 
51 United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (Newman, J.). 
52 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 750-51 (2005). 
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Second, even if judges ignored the Guidelines—which is unlikely for 
the reasons stated above—sentences will not return to their pre-Guideline 
equivalents.  Twenty years of Guidelines have changed judges and have 
forever altered their sense of what sentences are just and appropriate.53  
Good judging is difficult, time-consuming work54 and the Guidelines offer a 
systematic rational alternative that seems less arbitrary than the completely 
unguided discretion of the preceding indeterminate sentencing era.  An 
indeterminate sentencing process may seem especially daunting to an entire 
generation of federal judges that has never before considered a defendant’s 
just punishment without the training wheels of a sentencing grid.  The term 
“fear of judging” coined by Kate Stith and José Cabranes—commonly used 
to refer to the societal fear of judicial leniency and arbitrariness—may soon 
come to mean the phobia experienced by judges themselves of now having 
to make independent sentencing decisions.55   
Finally, an advisory guideline system may not lead to changes in 
sentencing results because district court judges may be wary of what 
lawmakers might do if they perceive that new sentences are wildly 
inconsistent with what the guidelines would have required.56  The threat of 
an adverse congressional response limiting judicial discretion may be the 
most significant prosecutorial check on sentencing.57 
                                                 
53 See Mauro, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that “[f]ederal judges—most of whom came to the 
bench after mandatory guidelines took effect 20 years ago—will likely flex their new muscles 
modestly.”). 
54 As one judge explained: 
Sentencing will be harder now than it was a few months ago.  District 
courts cannot just add up figures and pick a number within a narrow 
range.  Rather, they must consider all of the applicable factors, listen 
carefully to defense and government counsel, and sentence the person 
before them as an individual. 
Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (Adelman, J.). 
55 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS (1998). 
56 As one scholar notes “I rather suspect that the federal judiciary may come to regret what 
has happened [in Booker] after Congress and the DOJ step in.” John Gibeaut, All Sides Wary of 
Sentencing Ruling, 4 A.B.A. J. E REP. 2 (Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
journal/ereport/j14sentence.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005) (citing law professor and former 
federal prosecutor Frank O. Bowman). 
57 It is clear that the Department of Justice will also be actively monitoring judicial 
sentencing decisions.  See A View from Law Enforcement:  Hearing Before the United States 
Sentencing Commission, (Feb. 16, 2005) (testimony of Robert McCampbell, U.S. Attorney) at 
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/02_15_05/Transcript_16th.pdf (indicating that the 
Department of Justice “will be collecting data” on judicial sentences).  In January, Deputy 
Attorney General James Comey sent a memo to the U.S. attorneys’ offices urging prosecutors 
to promote the use of the federal guidelines “in all but the extraordinary cases,” while noting 
which judges sentence outside the guideline.  Schoenberg, supra note 47, at 1; see also Mauro, 
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Not only is there reason to believe that sentences will remain largely 
unchanged under the advisory guideline system, but the Court’s remedy 
handed the prosecution a significant victory in its ruling regarding appeals. 
The Court ruled that sentencing appeals in federal court would be governed 
by a newly-announced “reasonableness standard” rather than a de novo 
standard of review.58  What this vague new standard will mean in practice 
has yet to be determined.59  Arguably, it provides a less meaningful 
opportunity for appeal than the pre-Booker standard of de novo review.  As 
Justice Scalia writes, “[A] court of appeals might handle the new workload 
by approving virtually any sentence within the statutory range that the 
sentencing court imposes, so long as the district judge goes through the 
appropriate formalities.”60  This is sure to impact the defense more 
negatively since the vast majority of appeals are filed by defendants.61   
This change in the appeal standard is a true victory for federal 
prosecutors.  Ninety-eight percent of appeals are filed by defendants.62  The 
Department of Justice believes these appeals are a considerable strain on 
Government resources.  Indeed, the Department of Justice, which has long 
been seeking a means of reducing the number of appeals filed by 
defendants, instituted a broad strategy several years ago of recommending 
that prosecutors insert appeal waivers in all applicable plea agreements.63  
While its precise impact remains to be seen, this new appeal standard may 
                                                                                                             
supra note 11, at 1 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray: “The Department 
will continue to urge courts to apply the guidelines and to sentence offenders under the 
guidelines in order to vindicate the core purposes of sentencing.”). 
58 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct., 738, 766 (2005). 
59 Professor Steve Chanenson, Lecture at Association of Federal Defense Attorneys (Feb. 24, 
2005). 
60 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 794.  Justice Scalia adds: 
At the other extreme, a court of appeals might handle the new workload 
by approving virtually any sentence within the statutory range that the 
sentencing court imposes, so long as the district judge goes through the 
appropriate formalities, such as expressing his consideration of and 
disagreement with the Guidelines sentence. What I anticipate will happen 
is that ‘unreasonableness’ review will produce a discordant symphony of 
different standards, varying from court to court and judge to judge. . . . 
Id. 
61 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 48, at tbl. 57, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/ 
table57.pdf. 
62 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 48, at tbls. 57-58.  Of course, only ten percent of federal cases are 
appealed.  Id. 
63 Catharine M. Goodwin, Summary: 1996 Committee on Criminal Law Memo on Waivers of 
Appeal and Advisement of the Right to Appeal, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 212 (1998); John C. 
Keeney, Justice Department Memo: Use of Sentencing Appeal Waivers to Reduce the Number of 
Sentencing Appeals, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 209 (1998). 
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go a long way in discouraging or nullifying many of the appeals that remain 
in the wake of the appeal waiver policy.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The briar patch analogy has its limitations.  Unlike Brer Rabbit, the 
Government appears to be neither celebrating nor claiming victory.  But just 
as Brer Rabbit did not hope for an encounter with a ball of tar, the 
Government did not wish to have to defend the constitutionality of the 
mandatory guideline system.64  But if the guidelines were to be declared 
unconstitutional, its judicially-fashioned replacement could hardly be more 
favorable to the Government.  The threat of heavier evidentiary or 
procedural burdens at sentencing is practically eliminated.65  Most judges 
will probably continue to exercise (or not exercise) their new-found 
discretion in a manner consistent with the Guidelines.  Although some 
defendants may receive lighter sentences than the Guidelines might require, 
at least as many could receive higher sentences.  And if criminal defendants 
do not like their post-Booker sentences, they have less meaningful appeal 
rights after Booker than they did before.  For now it appears that this latest 
battle in the war over sentencing has been won by the prosecution rather 
than the defense.  As with Brer Rabbit and Brer Fox, the saga continues. 
 
                                                 
64 In fact, no one would have even thought it possible ten years ago that the Supreme Court 
would find the Guidelines unconstitutional.  Certainly many have challenged the 
constitutionality of the guidelines before Booker and Fanfan.  See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (finding constitutional the combination of statutory and 
guideline provisions that permit a judge to enhance a sentence based on prior convictions); 
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (rejecting claim that increase sentence for false 
testimony violates Fifth Amendment confrontation rights); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 
453 (1991) (concluding that application of guidelines in calculating drug sentence did not 
violate due process rights); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
65 Of course, nothing in Booker suggests a change in the Government’s Apprendi related 
duties.  Sentencing enhancement that increase the statutory maximum as described in Apprendi 
must still be charged in the indictment and found by a jury or admitted at the plea. 
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